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Article 7

Sentencing Under the Federal Youth Corrections Act:
The Interpretive Conflict Concerning Judicial Discretion

Introduction
The responsibility and power inherent in the sentencing procedures of most
courts in this country is awesome. A sentencing judge must balance diverse
societal objectives of fairness, firmness and deterrence in dealing with those
convicted of crime. The problem of converting theoretical objectives into
practical solutions is a difficult one. More troublesome, perhaps, than any
other aspect of the judicial function is the determination and imposition of
a proper sentence.' Judge Irving R. Kaufman of the Second Circuit captures
the import of this process when he states:
If the hundreds of American judges who sit on criminal cases
were polled as to what was the most trying facet of their jobs, the
vast majority would almost certainly answer 'Sentencing'. In no
other judicial function is the judge more alone; no other act of
his carries greater potentialities for good or evil
than the determi2
nation of how society will treat its transgressors.
Although the criminal trial judge has a burdensome task in his duty to
sentence, guidelines do exist upon which he should rely. Over the years
there has evolved, through legislative enactments, a statutory scheme for
sentencing criminal offenders. The current provisions of Title 18 of the
United States Code delineate four distinct groups of criminal offenders:
juveniles,3 youth offenders, 4 young adult offenders, 5 and adult offenders.
These various congressional enactments have numerous provisions relevant
1. Sentencing has long been recognized as an area of unique judicial discretionary
power accompanied by unique judicial problems. In direct reaction to the realization
of these problems, 28 U.S.C. § 334 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Aug. 25,
1958, Pub. L. No. 85-752, § 1, 72 Stat. 845) was passed. This statute provided for the

convening of Institutes and Joint Councils for the consideration of sentencing procedures.

Excerpts from some of these Institutes may be found at 26 F.R.D. 231; 35 F.R.D. 381
and 37 F.R.D. 111.
2. As quoted in Celler, Legislative Views as to the Value of the [Sentencing] Institute, 30 F.R.D. 185, 231 (1961).
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-37 (1970). This statute applies to offenders under 18 years
of age.

4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5001-26 (1970).
of age and under 22 years of age.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 4209 (1970).
of 22 and 26 years old.

This statute applies to offenders over 18 years

This statute applies to offenders between the ages
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to the sentencing of criminal offenders which contain alternatives for discretionary implementation by the trial judge, as well as mandatory provisions which prescribe defined parameters to which the judge must adhere
when imposing sentence. Unfortunately, the distinction between the discretionary and mandatory nature of sentencing is neither well-defined nor
unanimously agreed upon by the legal community. Often, divergent interpretations of statutory language arise, producing a lack of uniformity in the
implementation of those controversial sentencing provisions. The sentencing
provisions of the Federal Youth Corrections Act" (F.Y.C.A.) exemplify
just such an interpretative disagreement, and as such, provide the subject
matter with which this article shall be concerned.
Within the last several years disagreements have emerged concerning the
language of the Youth Corrections Act, specifically with regard to sentencing an offender between the ages of 18 and 22. The controversy centers
on the interpretation of section 5010(d) of the Act which states:
If the court shall find that the youth offender will not derive benefit from treatment under subsection (b) or (c), then the court
may sentence the youth offender under any other applicable
penalty provision. 7
6. 18 U.S.C. § 5005-26 (1970), hereinafter referred to as the Federal Youth Corrections Act (F.Y.C.A.), the Youth Act, or the Act.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(d) (1970). There are included in § 5010 three other sentencing provisions which read as follows:
(a) If the court is of the opinion that the youth offender does not need
commitment, it may suspend the imposition of sentence and place the youth
offender on probation.
(b) If the court shall find that a convicted person is a youth offender, and
the offense is punishable by imprisonment under applicable provisions of law
other than this subsection, the court may, in lieu of the penalty of imprisonment
otherwise provided by law, sentence the youth offender to the custody of the
Attorney General for treatment and supervision pursuant to this chapter until
discharged by the Division as provided in section 5017(c) of this chapter; or
(c) If the court shall find that the youth offender may not be able to derive maximum benefit from treatment by the Division prior to the expiration of
six years from the date of conviction it may, in lieu of the penalty of imprisonment otherwise provided by law, sentence the youth offender to the custody
of the Attorney General for treatment and supervision pursuant to this chapter for any further period that may be authorized by law for the offense or
offenses of which he stands convicted or until discharged by the Division as
provided in section 5017(d) of this chapter.
The effect of these subsections when read in conjunction with the release provisions
of § 5017 to which they respectively refer is that under § 5010(b) the youth shall
be conditionally released in four years, and unconditionally released six years from the
date of conviction. The youth setenced under § 5010(c) shall be conditionally released
not later than two years before the expiration of the term imposed by the court and
unconditionally released not less than one year from the date of his conditional release.
The following chart, updated from that found in Note, The Federal Youth Corrections Acts Past Concern in Need of Legislative Reappraisal, 11 AM. CGiM. L. RPv.
229, 244 (1972), indicates the confinement terms for those sentenced under these provi'sinn% of the F.Y.C.A.
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The question which presents itself in the application of this statutory
language concerns what duties and obligations, if any, this subsection imposes upon the trial judge in sentencing an individual otherwise eligible for
treatment under the F.Y.C.A. s
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has
most actively pursued this question. It was the first to suggest that section
5010(d) requires an affirmative finding by the court that the offender will
not benefit from Youth Corrections Act treatment before the youth receives
an adult sentence under the applicable federal statuteY Initially, the District
of Columbia Circuit held that this finding of "no benefit" might be implied.
It is now well established, however, that the findings must be explicitly made
by the trial judge as a prerequisite to adult sentencing. 10
In July 1973, the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Dorszynski,' 1 declined to follow the interpretation of the District of Columbia Circuit insofar as it required the trial judge to make an explicit finding that the youth
would not benefit from rehabilitation. Viewing the legislative history of
the F.Y.C.A., the Dorszynski court concluded that the Act's purpose was
"to make available a system for the sentencing and treating of youths to be
12
used in the judge's discretion.'
No other court to date has explicitly considered, and subsequently rejected, the District of Columbia Circuit's holdings. However, this same effect has been achieved by numerous federal courts by 'employing reasoning
similar to that found in Dorzsynski. The circuit courts advancing this inAVERAGE LENTH OF TIME SERVED PRIOR TO PAROLE (FY)
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8. The only limitations on eligibility imposed by the statute are that the offender
be a "youth offender" which is defined in § 5006(e) as a person under the age of
twenty-two at the time of conviction; and that the offense is punishable by imprisonment. For cases which deal, in part, with the question of eligibility see Rogers v.
United States, 326 F.2d 56 (10th Cir. 1963) and United States v. Coefield, 476 F.2d
1152 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
9. The District of Columbia Circuit's landmark holding to this effect was United
States v. Waters, 437 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In addition, the Fourth Circuit in
Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334 (4th Cir. 1973) cited with approval the Waters decision along with another District of Columbia Circuit case, United States v. Ward, 454
F.2d 992 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
10. United States v. Coefield, 476 F.2d 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
11. 484 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1973).
12. Id. at 851.
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terpretation have laced their F.Y.C.A. decisions with language referring to
the "great discretion" traditionally granted to trial judges in performing their
sentencing function. The conclusion reached by the Ninth Circuit in United
States v. Lane' 3 demonstrates this approach:
[T]he purpose of Congress in passing [the F.Y.C.A.] was to make
available for the discretionary use of federal judges a system for
the sentencing and treatment of youth offenders by permitting
the substitution 14of correctional rehabilitation rather than retributive punishment.
Other circuit courts, while not disavowing the discretionary interpretation,
have chosen instead to take a somewhat different approach. These courts
reason that if an otherwise eligible youth offender is sentenced as an adult,
the inference follows that the trial judge made the determination that the
defendant would not benefit from treatment under the F.Y.C.A. 15 These
courts consider that such an implicit finding satisfies the dictates of the
statutory provisions. They do not consider the explicit determination of "no
benefit" required by the District of Columbia Circuit to be a statutory
requisite.
There is no question but that a serious conflict exists among the circuits
concerning the correct interpretation of the sentencing provisions of the
F.Y.C.A. On the one extreme are the District of Columbia Circuit's decisions requiring a specific and affirmative finding of no rehabilitative benefit.
In direct contrast to these holdings, the Seventh Circuit specifically repudiates
the need for a judicial determination of a youth's amenability to rehabilitation prior to sentencing. The remaining circuits speak of "discretion" and
"judicial alternatives," thus, by strong implication, rejecting the District of
Columbia's holdings.
On December 10, 1973 the United States Supreme Court granted a writ
6
of certiorari to the case of United States v. Dorszynski.1 The Court will
seek to resolve this precise and narrow issue of statutory interpretation regarding the judicial determinations required prior to sentencing under the
Youth Corrections Act. Specifically, the Court will evaluate the conflicting
interpretations of the Act as articulated by the Seventh Circuit and the
District of Columbia Circuit.
13. 284 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1960).
14.

Id. at 941.

15. Most recently the Ninth Circuit employed this reasoning in United States v. Jar-

ratt, 471 F.2d 226, 230 (9th Cir. 1973), the court commenting:

"The [trial] court's

stated intention to sentence him as an adult was an implicit finding that Jarratt would
not derive benefit from treatment under paragraphs (b) or (c) [of § 5010]."
16. 484 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 11, 1973) (No. 73-5284).

U.S. -,

42 U.S.L.W. 3352 (Dec.
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An understanding of this interpretative conflict requires a basic understanding of the history, major provisions and objectives of the legislation.
The F.Y.C.A. is a uniquely comprehensive and complicated statute. It is
impossible to discuss the narrow question presented herein without a working
knowledge and understanding of the Act as a whole.
The Federal Youth CorrectionsAct-Its History and Provisions
The F.Y.C.A., passed in 1950,17 is designed to improve the administration
of criminal justice by providing a system for the treatment and rehabilitation
of federal youth offenders."' The Act, predicated upon the belief that
youthful offenders' represent a unique type of criminal, manifests the theory that youthful offenders possess far greater rehabilitative potential than
do their older, more criminally sophisticated, counterparts. The legislators
responsible for the law hoped to meet crime at its focal point, before the
traits of the habitual criminal were allowed to develop. As the vehicle for
reversing the criminal lifestyles of young offenders, the legislators chose to
substitute an innovative concept of correctional rehabilitation for the traditional theory of retributive punishment.2 0 In effectuating this rehabilitative
17. The Act as passed is considered to be the outgrowth of extensive studies undertaken in 1941 by a committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States. Among
the eminent jurists appointed by the Supreme Court were: Chief Judge John L. Parker,
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, chairman; Chief Judge Learned
Hand, of the Second Circuit; Chief Judge John C. Collet, of the Eighth Circuit; Chief
Judge Bolitha Laws, of the District Court for the District of Columbia; Chief Judge
Carroll C. Hincks of the District of Connecticut and Chief Judge Paul J. McCormick,
of the Southern District of California. A subcommittee of this committee gave particular attention to the problems and treatment of youth offenders. Many of that committee's recommendations are embodied in the Act. See H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess., 2 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 3983, 3983-93 (1950).
It is interesting to note that the F.Y.C.A., as originally enacted did not apply to the
District of Columbia (Act of Sept. 30, 1950, ch. 1115, § 2, 64 Stat. 1089). The Act
was amended in 1952 to render it applicable to those youths convicted of a federal
offense in the District, but excluded those convicted of violations of the District of
Columbia Criminal Code. On December 27, 1967 Congress amended § 5024 so that the
Act, in its entirety, was to apply to the District of Columbia (Pub. L. 90-226, title VIII,
§ 801(a), 81 Stat. 741).
18. See S. REP. No. 1180, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) and also H.R. REP. No. 2979,
81st Cong., 2d Sess., 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3983 (1950). These reports, submitted by the Committees on the Judiciary of the respective houses of Congress, are
almost identical in substance, Hereinafter they will be referred to as SENATE REPORT
(1949) and HOUSE REPORT (1950).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 5006(e) (1970) defines a youth offender as a person who is "under
the age of twenty-two years at the time of conviction." Under 18 U.S.C. § 4209
(1970) the provisions of the F.Y.C.A. may be applied to young adults in exceptional
cases. See notes 88-91 and accompanying text infra.
20. H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3983
(1950). The House Report went on to comment that statistics demonstrate:
[T]hat existing methods of treatment of criminally inclined youths are not
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concept, novel to the American criminal justice system, Congress elected to
fashion its program after the Borstal correctional system, successfully operating in England since 1894.21 The Borstal institutions, generally concerned with youths between the ages of 16 and 23, vary greatly in their
fundamental approach to rehabilitation. Some operate on authoritarian

principles of strict discipline.

Others enjoy a substantially more relaxed,

informal atmosphere. While appreciating these differences, a common denominator of rehabilitation exists in the primary emphasis on vocational
training, hard work and individualized guidance. 22 The system is based

on the theory that criminal youth, given special treatment appropriate to
their particular needs and their psychological characteristics, can return to
28
society as productive and social individuals.
Relying on the Borstal system as a structural and philosophical model,
Congress instituted a rehabilitative system for sentencing and treating its
youthful offenders. It began its efforts by reorganizing and enlarging the
existing Board of Parole and establishing within it a Youth Corrections
Division. 24 This Division provides for classification centers where complete
studies of each youth committed under section 5010 are conducted. 25

These

solving the problem....
By herding youth with maturity, the novice with the sophisticate, the impressionable with the hardened, and by subjecting youth offenders to the evil
influences of older criminals and their teaching of criminal techniques, without the inhibitions that come from normal contacts and counteracting prophylaxis, many of our penal institutions actively spread the infection of crime and
foster, rather than check it. Id. at 3985.
21. The system draws its name from an English penal institution at Borstal, which
in 1902 served as the experimental center for a program of strict discipline and hard
work combined with training programs, offering both individual guidance and encouragement.
22. WEST, THE YOUNG OFFENDER 225 (1967).
23. While the borstal system continues in England it has been said that its "golden
age" has passed. It is now being criticized for policies of "leniency, appeasement,
and soft treatment." This criticism has perhaps been brought on by the fact that no
longer are only the most promising individuals sent to a borstal institution. Rather,
the most promising get probation and the toughest youths get sent to borstals. Accordingly, it has been noted: "[S]uccess rates have dwindled, abscondings increased, and
optimism about the effectiveness of reformative training on liberal lines has correspondingly decreased." Id. at 227-28. For information on the borstal system see generally
BARMAN, THE ENGLISH BORSTAL SYSTEM (1934); HEALY & ALPER, CRIMINAL YOUTH
AND THE BORSTAL SYSTEM (1941); GIBBENS, PsYcIATmIc STUDIES OF BORSTAL LADS

(1963). In relation to the F.Y.C.A. see HousE AND SENATE REPORTS, supra note 18
and Note, The Federal Youth Corrections Act: Past Concern in Need of Legislative
Reappraisal,11 Am.CRIM. L. REV. 229 (1972).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 5005 (1970). The members of this Division will be members of
the Board of Parole designated by the Attorney General.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 5014 (1970). By the terms of the Act the study shall include:
"[A] mental and physical examination, to ascertain his [committed youth]
personal traits, his capabilities, pertinent circumstances of his school, family
life, any previous delinquency or criminal experience, and any mental or physical defect or other factor contributing to his delinquency."
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studies, done routinely for every youth committed to the division's custody,
can also be undertaken at the behest of the trial judge who, prior to sentenc26
ing, feels he wants more information regarding the youth in question.
Various evaluations and recommendations based upon these studies are then
compiled by those individuals who have worked with the youth.2 7 Ultimately these reports receive the attention of the sentencing judge to aid him
28
in his determination of whether to sentence the youth under the F.Y.C.A.
Youth CorrectionsAct Sentencing
Excepting paragraph (a) of section 5010, which permits the judge to "[s]uspend the imposition . . . of sentence and place the youth offender on probation, ' 29 the sentencing provisions of the F.Y.C.A.3 0 have precipitated considerable controversy. There remain three sentencing alternatives, 8 1 all of
which, whether through the utilization of indeterminate sentence provisions
or variously interpreted statutory language, have been the subject of much
judicial attention. The first of these alternatives allows the judge, "in lieu
of the penalty of imprisonment,"3 2 to place the youth in the charge of the
Attorney General until discharged pursuant to section 5017(c). Under
section 5017 (c), the youth must be released conditionally within four years
of his conviction and discharged unconditionally within six years from that
time. 33 The second alternative permits the judge to sentence the defendant
26. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(e) (1970). These reports are also known as "presentence reports."
27. For each youth committed to a classification center a classification committee,
composed of an administrator, a parole officer and clinical psychologist, is designated.
Each member submits his individual report and evaluations which, together with a joint
recommendation for treatment, are sent to the Board of Parole. The Board then makes
its own sentencing recommendation which is forwarded, along with the original classification committee information and recommendations, to the sentencing judge.
28. In the past, judges have not made extensive use of these 5010(e) reports. However, there is a marked increase in the utilization of such presentence reports in recent
years. See Schuman, Institutional Study of Youth Offenders, 54 F.R.D. 311, 314

(1968).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(a). See note 7 supra.
30. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5010(b)-(d) (1970). See note 7 supra.

31. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5010(b) and (c) (1970).

32. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b) (1970). This language becomes important when examining the constitutional challenges which have been brought against this provision. See,
e.g., Carter v. United States, 306 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Rogers v. United States,
326 F.2d 56 (10th Cir. 1973); Cunningham v. United States, 256 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.
1958). See also note 33 infra.
33. The terms of these provisions make it possible for a youth convicted of a crime
carrying a statutory maximum penalty of one year in prison, to face confinement in
a youth center for up to six years. In response, convicted persons have repeatedly
challenged the statute as violative of various constitutional guarantees such as freedom
from cruel and unusual punishment, equal protection of the laws, and due process of
the laws. The first case to uphold the constitutionality of the Act was Cunningham
v. United States, 256 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1958). In this case the defendant pleaded
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"for treatment and supervision . . . for any further period that may be authorized by law for the offense . . . of which he stands convicted or until
discharged by the Division as provided in section 5017(d). . . -84 The corresponding release provision, paragraph (d) of section 5017, states that the
youth shall be conditionally released "not later than two years before the
expiration of the term imposed by the court" and shall be discharged "unconditionally on or before the expiration of the maximum sentence imposed
. ... " This provision permits the judge to specify the term to be served
and is implemented when in the mind of the court doubt exists as to
whether six years of confinement and treatment as provided under section
5010 (b) will meet the rehabilitative needs of the youth, as well as the protective needs of society. By the terms of the final sentencing provision,
section 5010(d), the court, upon a finding that the youth will not derive
benefit from F.Y.C.A. treatment, may sentence him as it would an adult,
35
under the applicable penalty provision.
In the past, charges of unconstitutionality have frequently been levied
against the sentencing provisions of sections 5010(b) and (c). These allegations have for the most part dealt with the length of sentence to be served
under the Act, as well as with questions concerning the voluntariness of
guilty pleas entered in conjunction with a Youth Act sentence. The constiguilty to the misdemeanor offense of theft of property valued at less than $100, a crime
carrying a maximum sentence of one year in jail. He was sentenced under § 5010(b)
of the F.Y.C.A. and appealed the sentence as a violation of due process. The court
upheld the sentence, reasoning that treatment at a youth center under 5010(b) was
not punishment and the confinement envisioned under the Youth Corrections Act was
not equivalent to imprisonment. In the court's words the Act:
[A]ffords youthful offenders . . . not heavier penalties and punishment than
are imposed upon adult offenders, but the opportunity to escape from the
physical and psychological shocks and traumas attendant upon serving an ordinary penal sentence while obtaining hte benefits of corrective treatment,
looking to rehabilitation and social redemption and restoration." 256 F.2d at
472.
Other courts considering the question have relied on Cunningham and upheld the constitutionality of the provision. See United States v. Dancis, 406 F.2d 729 (2nd Cir.
1969); Johnson v. United States, 374 F.2d 966 (4th Cir. 1967); Connors v. United
States, 325 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Va. 1971); Abernathy v. United States, 418 F.2d 288
(5th Cir. 1969); Guidry v. United States, 433 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1970); McGann v.
United States, 440 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1971); Rogers v. United States, 326 F.2d 56
(10th Cir. 1963); Eller v. United States, 327 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1964); United States
v. Rehfield, 416 F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1969); Foote v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 627
(D. Nev. 1969); Harvin v. United States, 445 F.2d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States
v. Baker, 429 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1970); Standley v. United States, 318 F.2d 700 (9th
Cir. 1963); Brisco v. United States, 368 F.2d 214 (3rd Cir. 1966); Chapin v. United
States, 341 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1965); United States v. Cocklin, 178 F. Supp. 318 (E.D.
Ky. 1959); Carter v. United States, 306 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(c) (1970). See note 7 supra for the complete text of the
statute.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(d) (1970). The precise language of this subsection can be
found at p. 595 supra.
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tutionality of these provisions, however, is now well established and no
longer presents a viable legal issue.36 The focus of the debate on sentencing
under the F.Y.C.A. has instead turned to the last mentioned provision,
section 5010(d). The issue is no longer constitutionality; challenges now concern statutory interpretation. The disagreement centers upon the precise nature and extent of the duty imposed upon the trial judge to find that a youth
will "not derive benefit from treatment" under the Act before he sentences that
youth as an adult. Does this statute contemplate the judicial study of empirical data concerning the youth before sentencing, or rather, does it place
no additional responsibilities on the judge, serving merely as a vehicle to
permit sentencing of "youth offenders" as adults when such is deemed in
the court's discretion as the most advisable course? The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia views the former suggestion as the correct interpretation, 7 while other circuits and authorities consider the latter as the
legally preferable position. 8
Ostensibly the issue considered here may appear as no more than a semantical exercise. In fact, it presents a question which carries with it consequences and repercussions of a most serious nature to the individual of36. See note 33 supra, where the constitutional issues of due process, equal protection, and the ban on cruel and unusual punishment are discussed. In addition to these
challenges, F.Y.C.A. sentences have been appealed as unconstitutional on several other
grounds. Most often it is alleged that the defendant entered a plea of guilty after
being given either misleading information or no information at all concerning the possibility of his serving a longer sentence under the Youth Act than if sentenced under
the applicable statute. While there is some disagreement among the circuits, it generally has been held that the appellant is entitled to a hearing to determine the voluntariness of his plea. See Pilkington v. United States, 315 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1963);
Workman v. United States, 337 F.2d 226 (1st Cir. 1964); Stephens v. United States,
383 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1967); DeWitt v. United States, 383 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1967);
James v. United States, 388 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1968) (unnecessary to remand for hearing to determine voluntariness of pleas since court affirmatively found that appellant
was misled); McCullough v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 740 (N.D. Fla. 1964); United
States v. DeMario, 246 F. Supp. 786 (E.D. Mich. 1965); Kotz v. United States, 353
F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1965); Freeman v. United States, 350 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1965);
Chapin v. United States, 341 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1965) (holding guilty plea not involuntary as a matter of law); Harper v. United States, 368 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1966).
Contra, Cunningham v. United States, 256 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1958) (holding that defendant had tacitly assented to a Youth Act sentence); Rawls v. United States, 330 F.2d
777 (5th Cir. 1964) (citing Cunningham); Carter v. United States, 306 F.2d 283 (D.C.
Cir. 1962). For cases concerned with other constitutional questions see United States
v. Baker, 429 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1970) (contention that Act was an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power to the judiciary was held invalid); Guidry v. United
States, 433 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1970) (upheld discretion of sentencing judge); Standley
v. United States, 318 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1963) (rejected argument that judge's power
was unconstitutionally broad); Cherry v. United States, 299 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1962)
(rejected claim of double jeopardy); See also Annot. 11 A.L.R. FED. 492 (1972).
37. The Fourth Circuit in Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334 (4th Cir. 1973) joined
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia on this question. See note 9 and
accompanying text supra.
38. See text accompanying note 15, supra.
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fender involved. By applying the more strict affirmative finding of no
benefit standard of the District of Columbia Circuit, a far greater number
of young men and women will be committed to youth centers for treatment
as provided under the F.Y.C.A.,3 9 rather than serving time in federal penitentiaries as they would were this standard not employed. 40 Obviously numerous benefits accrue to the offender sentenced to youth centers for treatment which is unavailable to the convict confined to a penitentiary. While
"sentencing for treatment . . . contains neither qualitatively nor quantitatively the elements of penalty,"' 41 precisely what constitutes actual "treatment" is unclear. Nonetheless, confinement in a youth center, with the concomitant opportunities for vocational training and individual guidance, must
be considered highly preferable to serving time in a penitentiary.4 2 A youth
sentenced under the F.Y.C.A. also enjoys, at least in theory, the unique
benefit of having his conviction automatically set aside upon his unconditional release. 43 Therefore, unquestionably important consequences hinge
on the interpretation given to section 5010(d) by the court. The District of
Columbia Circuit has construed the statute literally, resulting in greater implementation of the Federal Youth Corrections Act.
The Districtof Columbia Circuit'sInterpretationof Section 5010(d)

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia made judi39. 18 U.S.C. § 5011 provides that committed youth offenders "shall undergo treatment in institutions . . . including training schools, hospitals, farms, forestry and other
camps, and other agencies that will provide the essential varieties of treatment." Treatment, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 5006(g) means "corrective and preventive guidance
and training designed to protect the public by correcting the antisocial tendencies
of youth offenders."
40. While the proposition presented here is basically true, there is some problem
in precluding penitentiary confinement under the Youth Act. Under § 5015(b) the
Director of the Bureau of Prisons may transfer a youth from one institution to another. The question which then arises is can a youth sentenced under the F.Y.C.A. be
confined in a penitentiary as opposed to a youth institution? The courts disagree on
this point. The opinion in Harvin v. United States, 445 F.2d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
flatly holds that a youth sentenced under the F.Y.C.A. cannot be placed in a penitentiary
because such a placement would not be consistent with the rehabilitative purposes of
the Act. Contra, United States v. Reef, 268 F. Supp. 1015 (D. Colo. 1967); Coats v.
Markley, 200 F. Supp. 686 (S.D. Ind. 1962). See Note, The Federal Youth Corrections Act: Past Concern in Need of Legislative Reappraisal,11 AM. ClRM. L. REV. 229
(1972).
41. Smearman v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 134, 136 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
42. In implementing the legislative goals of individualized treatment and rehabilitation fashioned after the Borstal system, see notes 20-21 supra, the youth centers provide
remedial educational programs as well as high school equivalency courses, extensive vocational training and a wide range of recreational programs. In addition, individual
treatment is given to the youths by the professional staff at the center, with psychological therapy available when needed. See Schuman, Institutional Study of Youth Offenders, 54 F.R.D. 311 (1972).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 5021 states in part: "(a) Upon the unconditional discharge by the
division of a committed youth offender before the expiration of the maximum sentence
imposed upon him, the conviction shall be automatically set aside .... "
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cial history when, in United States v. Waters,44 it interpreted the language,
"If the court shall find that the youth offender will not derive benefit from
treatment under subsection (b) or (c), then the court may sentence the
youth offender under any other applicable penalty provision, '45 to impose
unique responsibilities on the sentencing court. Specifically, the court held
that a sentencing judge "must affirmatively find that the youth offender will
not benefit from rehabilitative treatment before the offender can be sentenced as an adult pursuant to the statute governing the offense for which
he was convicted." ' 46 The court in Waters did not dispute the discretionary
sentencing powers of the trial judge but held that "this discretion is circumscribed by the findings of fact in the individual case which the District Judge
is required to make either explicitly or implicitly. ' 47 While not questioning
the existence of discretionary powers vested in the trial court, the court of
appeals did prescribe parameters within which a sentencing court must
operate when seeking to deny Youth Act treatment to an otherwise
eligible offender. It did this by limiting such a denial to exceptional cases
48
in which the judge determines that rehabilitative efforts would be futile.
In upholding this restrictive interpretation of section 5010(d), the court employed a standard referred to in the report of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary. In that report the committee suggested that a judge, convinced
that a youth was incorrigible and would derive no help from the Youth Act
program, could appropriately impose an adult sentence under the applicable
49
provision of law.
The above-mentioned standard of "incorrigibility" and the declaration
that the traditional discretion of the trial judge is "circumscribed by the facts
of the individual case" 50 are two of the most noted concepts emerging from
the Waters decision. Together with the basic holding that a court, before
sentencing a youthful offender as an adult, must affirmatively find that the
youth will not benefit from treatment under the Act, they form the foundation upon which the growing case law concerning the interpretative issue
of section 5010(d) continues to be built. 5 '
44. 437 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
45.

18 U.S.C. § 5010(d) (1970).

46. 437 F.2d at 724 (emphasis in original). Here, a 19 year old defendant was
convicted after pleading guilty to assault with a dangerous weapon and robbery.
47. Id. at 725.
48. Id. at 724.
49. id. at 724-25; see also SENATE REPORT (1949) and HousE REPORT (1950).
50. See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
51. An interesting collateral matter concerning deterrence was mentioned in Waters.
The trial court in that case, while not sentencing under the F.Y.C.A., did recommend
that the defendant be placed in a youth institution to serve his 4-12 year sentence.
The court of appeals saw this combination as an unacceptable attempt to rehabilitate

the defendant while having him serve as a deterrent to others. The court stated:
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After the Waters decision in 1970 the District of Columbia Circuit addressed the basic issue of 5010(d) sentencing on numerous occasions. Two
of the more important cases are United States v. Ward 52 and United States v.
Howard.5 3 In the Ward case the court reaffirmed Waters and remanded
the case for an illumination of the court's reasoning in denying Youth Act
treatment. 54 Significant as a foreshadowing of future decisions, the circuit
court referred in a footnote to the possibility that while an adult sentence
might be the better sentence for a particular defendant that does not preclude his receiving benefit if sentenced under the F.Y.C.A. 55 Presumably,
this finding of benefit would be sufficient to warrant a F.Y.C.A. sentence. The second case, Howard v. United States, applied the Youth
Act to those youths convicted of murder.5 6 The government argued that
the conviction of a crime carrying a mandatory penalty of death or life
imprisonment5 7 precluded sentencing under the Act. The court rejected this
reasoning on the basis that the youth was within the 18-22 age bracket and
the crime was one punishable by imprisonment, thereby meeting the statu58
tory requisites for Youth Act treatment.
While the preceding cases were important for the reasons mentioned, they
do not compare in significance to the decision rendered in United States v.
Coefield"9 in which the court of appeals greatly expanded its previous
holding in Waters. Language in Coefield effectively dispelled any doubt
whether the finding required by 5010(d) as a condition for adult sentencing could be left to implication.6" The court ruled that the trial court must
explicitly make such a finding. 61 In fashioning this rule, the court imposed
novel, and to some minds, extreme requirements upon the trial judge. It
held that when a trial judge chooses not to sentence a defendant under the
The objective of deterrence may be taken into account by the trial judge, not
by overriding the statute's rehabilitation provisions, but rather by combining
them with a sentence exposing the defendant to a maximum term greater than

that called for in subsection (b). 437 F.2d at 726.
52. 454 F.2d 992 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
53. 449 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
54. 454 F.2d at 992.
55. Id. at 995 n.16.
56. The defendant was a 20 year old youth convicted of, among other crimes, first
degree felony murder.
57. 22 D.C. CODE § 2404 (1973).
58. In this case the jury concluded that the defendant should be punished by life

imprisonment.
59. 476 F.2d 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
considering the issue en banc.
60. Id. at 1156.

This was the first instance of the circuit court

61. A question had arisen as to whether the finding of no benefit could be made
by implication.

The Court in Waters precipitated this confusion when it referred to

the trial court's findings of fact being made "either explicitly or implicitly."
at 725,

437 F.2d
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F.Y.C.A. and does not avail himself of a 5010(e) classification study report,6 2 or, when he imposes a sentence contrary to the recommendation
contained in that report, he must state his reasons for doing so.6 3 The court
deemed this statement of reasons "to be essential to a knowledgeable administration of the Act as intended by Congress. ' 64 The imposition of this requirement cured the obvious defect in the Waters decision whereby a judge
could apparently simply declare he had made an affirmative finding that
the defendant would not benefit from F.Y.C.A. treatment without relying
upon any empirical data regarding the particular youth other than the facts
presented in the adversary context of the trial.
The far-reaching extension of the Waters holding embodied in the court's
decision in United States v. Coefield underwent an even more dramatic
amplification in United States v. Phillips.6 5 The court of appeals in Phillips
began with the basic premise announced in Coefield that a judge must state
his reasons for denying Youth Act treatment when sentencing contrary to a
5010(e) report recommendation. It then extended this requirement that the
judge express his reasoning even to the situation in which he does follow
the 5010(e) recommendation. 66 Specifically, the court explained that its
holding in Coefield,67 that the judge need not accompany his denial of
Youth Act treatment with reasons independent of a classification report which recommended such a denial, presupposed that the report provided the requisite reasons for such a disposition.68 Under the facts of
Phillips, the court found such a supposition ill-founded. Rather, the court
determined that the presentence report, upon which the trial judge had exclusively relied, did not contain reasons which warranted overriding what the
court deemed an eligible offender's "presumptive right to Youth Act rehabilitative treatment."6 9 In addressing the issue of an appellate court's
responsibilities when a presentence report has been adopted by the trial
judge the court stated:
62. For a descriptive explanation of a 5010(e) report see notes 25-28 and accom-

panying text supra.
63. 476 F.2d at 1157.
64. Id. at 1157. The court made clear in imposing this requirement that they were
not seeking to elicit any litany or prescribed formula but did consider it essential
to insure: 1) that the judge was aware that the Act was applicable to his case and
he understood the scope of his discretion under the Act; 2) that the judge was informed
of the pertinent facts relating to the defendant; and 3) that the judge has given consideration and related the facts of the individual case to the applicable law.
65. 479 F.2d 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
66. Id. at 1206.

67. See notes 61-64 and accompanying text supra.
68. 479 F.2d at 1202.
69. Id. at 1205. This pronouncement by the Court in Phillips represented one of
the most radical statements of the case.
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This adoption does not, however, obviate the need for exposure
of the 'factors which informed and shaped' the sentencing decision,
nor relieve this court of responsibility to determine whether those
reasons, from whatever source, demonstrate a 'present
and vis70
ible' rationality in relation to Congressional objectives.
The reasons offered by the 5010(e) report and its adoption by the trial
court for denying Youth Act sentencing to Phillips did not, in the court of
appeal's opinion, meet the present and visible rationality criteria. The report had presented only two reasons in support of its recommendation for
adult sentencing. The first being that "[the defendant appears to be a
street-wise individual." 71 The classification committee also inferred that because the defendant was arrested while on Youth Act probation, he had
failed to prove himself as rehabilitative. 72 In finding these reasons inadequate for denial of Youth Act treatment, the court of appeals examined and
passed judgment not only on the actions of the trial judge, but also, more
significantly, on the professional opinion of those individuals employed at
the Youth Center who had compiled the 5010(e) report. In choosing to
look behind the professional judgments rendered by the classification committees, the court of appeals took an innovative step in assuring that a youth,
before being denied rehabilitative treatment, must be found unable to derive
7
benefit from such treatment. 3

Through these principal cases, as well as others of somewhat lesser sig70. Id. The thought that there must be a "present and visible rationality" between
the reasons offered and the congressional intent was originally articulated by the District of Columbia Circuit in United States v. Reed, 476 F.2d 1145, 1150 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
71. 479 F.2d 1200, 1203-04 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The court objected that the report
did not reveal the meaning of the label 'street-wise.' It stated that no court should
be left to conjecture about what the term was intended to convey or conceal.
72. Id. at 1204. This reasoning was also rejected by the circuit as establishing an
inability to be rehabilitated. Thus, the case was remanded for reconsideration of the
sentence based on a full statement of reasons. See also United States v. Riley, 481
F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
73. This action of the court in scrutinizing the reasoning of the 5010(e) report was
severely criticized by Judge Wilkey in his statement explaining why he would hear the
subsequent case, United States v. Tillman, No. 71-1352 (D.C. Cir., June 6, 1973) en
banc. As in Phillips, the court in Tillman analyzed a 5010(e) report and found its
reasoning too vague and imprecise to permit adult sentencing and therefore remanded
for reconsideration of F.Y.C.A. sentencing. Judge Wilkey commented on this decision:
What is done here .. .is in effect an effort to examine the merits of the
sentence the District Court has imposed. In fact, Judge Bazelon goes one step
further, he goes behind the sentence . . . to inquire in minute detail as to the
accuracy of the penological concepts employed by the correctional authorities
in maling their recommendation to the District Judge. It is a grievous enough
distortion of the relationship between the appellate court and the District
Court for the appellate court to interject itself into the sentencing process by
evaluating the merits of a District Judge's sentence. It is even less defensible
to go one step backward in the process to analyze the professional value judgments made by the correctional authorities. Tillman slip op. at 27-28.
The Tillman decision was subsequently vacated on August 10, 1973.
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nificance, 7 4 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has established a "presumptive right" to Youth Act treatment. 75 Impliedly, this
right must be considered before the court reaches its determination
to sentence a youth as an adult. The legal theory propounded by
these decisions has not enjoyed a universal acceptance by other circuits. As
noted earlier, only the Fourth Circuit has unreservedly adopted the holdings
of Waters and Ward.76 The Third Circuit, while rejecting the totality of the
Coefield requirements, 77 has directly addressed the 5010(d) question of interpretation. It concluded that the trial record must demonstrate that the
district court made a finding that the defendant would not benefit from
treatment under sections 5010(b) or (c) of the Youth Act. 78 The First
Circuit in United States v. MacDonald79 arrived at a more ambiguous decision. In this opinion the court remanded the case to the district court "to
make the findings required by the Federal Youth Corrections Act." 8 0
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Jarratt8' held the 5010(d)
finding implicit in an adult sentence. However, since it was remanding the
case on other grounds, it held the district court should make an express
82
finding that the defendant would not benefit from F.Y.C.A treatment.
With the exception of these decisions, some of which are not extremely definitive, the circuits for the most part have viewed Youth Act sentencing as
discretionary, imposing no mandatory duties or considerations on the trial
judge.13 Maintaining that the F.Y.C.A. provides merely an alternative mode
of sentencing, the court in Guidry v. United States8 4 construed the Act as
providing an additional option to the trial judge when, in a particular instance,
the more customary sanctions of imprisonment, fine, probation or suspension
appear inadequate.8 5 Similarly, in United States v. Baker 6 the court ascribed
74. See United States v. Riley, 481 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v.
Harvin, 445 F.2d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. McCoy, 429 F.2d 739 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
75. United States v. Phillips, 479 F.2d at 1202.
76. See notes 9 and 37 and accompanying text supra.
77. See notes 59,-64 and accompanying text supra.
78. Williams v. United States, 476 F.2d 970 (3d Cir. 1973). In that case the judge
stated in open court that he had given considerable thought to the sentence and had
decided not to sentence the defendant under the F.Y.C.A.
79. 455 F.2d 1259 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 962 (1972).
80. Id.at 1265.
81. 471 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1972).
82. Id.at 230. See note 15 supra.
83. United States v. Lane, 284 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1960); United States v. Bamberger, 456 F.2d 1119 (3d Cir. 1972); Cunningham v. United States, 256 F.2d 467 (5th
Cir. 1958); United States v. Baker, 429 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1970); Smearman v. United
States, 279 F. Supp. 134 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
84. 317 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 433 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1970).
85. Id.at 1112.
86. 429 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1970).
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to the 81st Congress the belief that vesting broad discretion "in the sentencing
judge was integral to the effective disposition of the post-conviction treatment
'8 7
of offenders."
The aforementioned cases indicate the considerable disagreement concerning the import and interpretation of section 5010(d) of the Federal
Youth Corrections Act. The following pages will explore the arguments
favoring the District of Columbia Circuit's interpretation as well as persuasive reasoning contradicting it. The rationale employed by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in supporting its holding that an affirmative finding of "no benefit" must be made will be examined first. Following
this, the arguments and evidence relied upon to rebut this position will be
analyzed.
The District of Columbia Circuit'sRationale
In holding that the terms of section 5010(d) require an affirmative finding of
"no benefit" before a youth offender is sentenced as an adult, the court
placed primary emphasis upon the literal meaning of the statutory language.
It construed the statute to say, in effect, that a condition to sentencing a
youth offender as an adult is a finding that he will not receive benefit from
rehabilitative treatment. Citing the terms of the statute itself, with emphasis
as indicated in the opinion in United States v. Waters, most clearly underlined
this point: "Subsection (d) requires: 'If the court shall find that the youth
offender will not derive benefit from treatment under subsection (b) or (c),
then the court may sentence the youth offender under any other applicable
penalty provision.' 88 In short, the District of Columbia decisions do no
more than apply the literal and intended meaning of the statutory language.
The words and their import are plain on their face and thus, it is held, so are
the judicial considerations mandated by the section.
The court in Waters also relied upon a comparison of the statutory language of section 5010(d) and -that found in section 4209 of Title 18 of the
United States Code80 to support its contention that under the former provision
a "no benefit" finding must be made. Section 4209 of Title 18 authorizes
the application of the F.Y.C.A. sentencing provisions to "young adults,"
ages 22-26, in those instances where it is reasonable to believe the defendant
will benefit from treatment at a youth center. The Waters court relied upon
language of the report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary which indicated that section 4209 contemplated application of the F.Y.C.A. to a
young adult only upon a special finding by the court that the particular de87. Id. at 1347.
88. 437 F.2d at 726 (emphasis added).

89. 18 U.S.C. § 4209 (1970).
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fendant would benefit by treatment prescribed in the Act.90 In considering
this legislative history to section 4209 the District of Columbia Circuit reasoned that the manner in which a trial judge is to exercise his discretion when
dealing with "youth offenders" is substantially the converse of the scheme
provided for "young adult" offenders. 91 Therefore, the argument suggests
that if an affirmative finding of some benefit is needed to apply the Act to
a special class of otherwise ineligible offenders, then a corresponding affirmative finding of "no benefit" is needed to deny the fruits of the Act to those
for whose advantage it was originally enacted.
In addition to relying upon the language of the subsection in question, the
court throughout its opinions frequently referred to the congressional intent
which originally motivated passage of the Act. While the legislative history
of the Youth Act provided the main thrust of the arguments countering
the District of Columbia Circuit's opinions, 9 2 it nonetheless served also
as a main source of reference for the District of Columbia court itself.
The court maintained that the legislative history accompanying the Act supported its theory that Congress, having determined that younger criminals have
a higher potential for rehabilitation, sought to give priority to the corrective
treatment of offenders between the ages of 18 and 22. In support of this
proposition, the court in Waters cited the following excerpt from the House
Committee on the Judiciary report:
The underlying theory of the bill is to substitute for retributive
punishment methods of training and treatment designed to correct
and prevent antisocial tendencies. It departs from the mere punitive idea of dealing with criminals and looks primarily to the objective idea of rehabilitation.98
From this language, and other similar passages, the court concluded that
the rehabilitation of the greatest number of young offenders is the goal of
the Act. It realized, however, that this ultimate purpose does not grant a
carte blanche to every youth offender to receive an F.Y.C.A. sentence. As
testimony to this realization, the court in Waters cited the report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and expressly conceded that if a youth is
found "incorrigible" by the judge, and therefore unable to derive help from
tho Youth Act program, then he may be sentenced as an adult with90. S. REP. No. 2013, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & Av. NEWS 3891,
3891-92 (1958).
91. 437 F.2d at 723-24.
92. For a detailed discussion of the reliance on legislative history see notes 10208 and accompanying text, infra.
93. H.R. REP. No. 2179, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1949); See notes 49 & 50 and
accompanying text, supra.
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out further consideration of the Act.94 The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, in citing such language of the Senate report, did so with
an awareness of the discretionary grant being vested in the sentencing judge.
It, however, in no way saw this as destructive of its basic thesis that before
denying Youth Act treatment the judge must reach certain determinations
regarding the youth's amenability to rehabilitation. Rather the court perceived such legislative history as supportive of its interpretation. In so
doing, the court reasoned that the Senate Committee, by employing such
terms as "incorrigible," and by suggesting that the judge be "convinced" that
the defendant would derive no help from Youth Act treatment,
placed a high premium on rehabilitative treatment, with consequent stringent
standards for the denial of such treatment. From this emerges the contention
that Congress in 1950 sought to provide for the rehabilitation of youths involved in crime and that the construction of 5010(d) advanced by the
District of Columbia Circuit's holdings would necessitate a greater utilization
of the Act. Arguably, a consequent higher degree of successful rehabilitation
would follow from such a utilization, ultimately resulting in the best possible
effectuation of the congressional purpose in passing the Federal Youth
Corrections Act.
Combined with the explanatory reasoning set out in the previously discussed opinions, the above concepts comprise the legal theory upon which
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia based its 5010(d) interpretative holdings. Extensive disagreement prevails concerning the legal
cogency of this theory as well as doubt regarding the wisdom of such an
interpretation.95 The audible voice of dissension transverses the spectrum of
the legal profession, ranging from court decisions, to practitioner-advocates
and even federal legislative proposals.
A bill proposed by Senator J. Glenn Beall (R.-Md.) to amend paragraph
(d) of section 5010 is one example of such dissent. The legislation, originally
introduced as S.3290 in March of 1972, 91 was not acted upon by Congress,
97
and therefore, was subsequently reintroduced the following year as S.1198.
The primary purpose and effect of the legislation is to remove any question as to the discretionary powers of a trial judge in sentencing an eligible
youth offender as an adult. After listing a number of factors which the
court shall consider in determining whether a youth should be sentenced
under the F.Y.C.A., 9s the bill specifically provides that nothing in the Act
94. 437 F.2d at 724-725.
95. See notes 83-85 and accompanying text, supra.
96. 118 CONG. REc. 3196 (daily ed. March 3, 1972).
97. 119 CONG. Rnc. 4553 (daily ed. March 14, 1973).
98. Included among the factors to be considered are: 1) any presentence report
or any report on the mental, emotional, or physical conditions of the defendant which
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should be construed to preclude the trial judge from sentencing a "youth
offender" as an adult if he believes the F.Y.C.A. should not apply. 99
In his March 1971 statement in the Congressional Record pertaining to
this bill, Senator Beall expressed the view shared by many opposed to the previously outlined holdings of the District of Columbia Circuit when he
stated:
Nowhere in the committee reports, at the committee hearings or
in the debates on the floor is there any indication that a judge is
precluded from imposing a regular adult sentence unless he first
finds that an eligible defendant will not receive any benefit from
the Youth Act sentence. 10 0
Senator Beall felt that the District of Columbia Circuit has interpreted the
law in such a manner so as to pervert the legislation to the point that it "is
1
detrimental to the citizens of the District of Columbia and its environs."''
To date, the Committee on the Judiciary has taken no action regarding the
bill. However, the mere existence of the proposed legislation indicates the
serious discontent with the trend established by the District of Columbia Circuit.
Opposition to the Districtof Columbia Circuit'sInterpretation
One school of legal thought rejects in its entirety the District of Columbia
Circuit's interpretation of section 5010(d) of the Youth Corrections Act. The
basic premise advanced by those individuals contesting the District of Columbia court's interpretation is that the F.Y.C.A. provides the trial judge with
only another sentencing alternative with no conditional preference over any
other alternative. Thus, this school refutes the mandatory nature ascribed to
that subsection by the court. In terms of a legal argument, those advocating
a discretionary interpretation of section 5010(d) rely almost exclusively upon
the legislative history of the Act. As a practical matter, they contemplate
great problems with the implementation of the affirmative finding ruleviewing it as ultimately destructive of the original purposes of the Youth Act.
Combined with several minor points, these considerations comprise the
essence of the dissenters' arguments.
is available from any reliable source; 2) whether a proper treatment program is available that is suited to the needs of the youth offender; 3) any prior criminal conduct
by the youth offender, its nature and frequency; 4) the attitude .. .of the youth offender toward society and his conduct in society; 5) reports, statements or testimony
bearing on the character of the offender, his personal abilities, education . . .; 6) the
likelihood of swift release from incarceration and treatment if sentenced under the Act
and the danger posed to society, if such early release should occur.
99. S. 1198, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
100. 118 CONG. REC. 3196-97 (daily ed. March 3, 1972).
101. 118 CONG. REC. at 3197; 119 CONG. REC. at 4554 (daily ed. March 14, 1973).
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The legislative history of the F.Y.C.A. reveals numerous references to the
discretionary nature of the Act's provisions. The Senate report issued by
the Committee on the Judiciary includes commentary to the effect that the
bill would not deprive the court of any of its present sentencing functions, 10 2
but would merely "authorize the court, as another alternative" to sentence a
youth to treatment.' 0 3 These statements lend credence to the view that section 5010(d) is a judicial alternative rather than a legislative dictate. While
welcoming the Committee Report references to the alternative nature of the
bill, those disagreeing with the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
rely most heavily upon references made during the Senate hearings to the
purely discretionary character of the bill. Testifying at the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary hearings were many members of the original judicial committee appointed by the Supreme Court to make a study of the criminal correction system in the federal courts, as Well as federal correction officials
and leading members of the bar.10 4 Nowhere, it is argued, in the 121 pages
of hearings testimony is there mentioned the requirement that a finding of
fact regarding a youth's receptivity to rehabilitation must be made before a
10 5
judge sentences a youth under a statute other than the F.Y.C.A.
Rather, the text is interspersed with comments indicating that "the bill in no
way reduces the authority or interferes with the sentencing powers of the
judges."' 0 6 The text of the hearings also contains explanatory statements
which elucidate the viewpoint of those men who helped create the legislation.107 The following remarks of Judge Parker, a member of the judicial

committee formed to study correctional problems, illustrate the nature of
these statements. After discussing a point relating to eligibility under the
Act, Judge Parker stated:
It [the Act] does not interfere with the power of the judge even
with respect to those [youth] offenders, but gives him merely an
alternative method of treatment of those people. .

.

. All that

102. S. REP. No. 1180, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1949).
103. Id. at 2.
104. See note 17 supra for details concerning this committee and its members.
105. Hearings on S. 1114 & S. 2609 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
106. Id. at 13.
107. The original intention of the legislators was to have the bill pertain to offenders up to age 24 years of age. The following quote of Judge Laws reflects some of
the thinking concerning the age limitation and provides additional insights into the discretionary nature of the Act envisioned by those testifying at the hearings:

Now, if it were an absolute mandate that a judge must place all of them
[youth offenders] under the jurisdiction of the Youth Division, then perhaps
we should lower the age limit; but inasmuch as it is purely optional with a
judge as to whether this treatment is to be given, we feel that in a given case
the judge ought to have the opportunity to go as high as 23 years of age. Id.

at 10.
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the bill does is to provide that if... he thinks that the offender
before the court is one that can be treated with advantage under
this bill, he can sentence him under this bill instead of under the
existing law. 108
Those who disagree with the decisions of the District of Columbia Circuit
conclude that the quotations offered here, in addition to numerous others
contained in the legislative history, indicate the contemplation of a purely
discretionary implementation of the Act by those instrumental in its creation. To many, this argument in and of itself is convincing, and no further
evidence need be presented. Yet others choose to transpose the discussion
from one of past legislative intent to present and future application.
The critics of the District of Columbia Circuit claim that the "no benefit"
standard has no practical application. They argue that such a vague and
amorphous standard invites the destruction of the purpose of the Act because it permits an influx of confirmed criminals into the youth corrections
system. Furthermore, they suggest that the standard amounts to no real
standard at all since even the most hardened criminal would derive some
benefit from treatment under the Youth Act, even if only more pleasant
surroundings.' 0 9 Senator Beall made a similar point when he suggested:
To find that an offender cannot benefit from the youth corrections provisions would seem to be almost impossible. . . . In essence it requires the court to find the offender beyond hope and
requires the proof of a negative fact about which no one can be
certain. 110
The premise above enunciated proceeds to the logical conclusion that the
"no benefit" standard would encompass every convicted youth offender and
that the youth centers would become so unmanageably overcrowded as to
preclude the individualized treatment and vocational guidance requisite to
positive rehabilitation. 1 ' It is additionally contended that such a wholesale
108. Id. at 43.
109. This same argument was expressed in United States v. Riley, 481 F.2d 1127,
1139 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
110. 118 CONG. REC. 3196 (daily ed. March 3, 1972). The same point was made
in a recent law review article: "This requirement [of finding no benefit] places an
almost impossible demand on the sentencing judge who, without highly sophisticated
powers of intuition approaching clairvoyance, would be hard-pressed to say with any
finality that any youth, other than an already hardened offender, would not benefit from
specialized treatment." Note, The F.Y.C.A.: Past Concern in Need of Legislative
Reappraisal,11 AM. CRIM. L. Rev. 229, 255 (1972).
111. The problem of overcrowding of youth facilities was discussed in detail in
United States v. Alsbrook, 336 F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C. 1971). The court held that
"[t]here was no legal authority for diverting otherwise eligible youths to adult institutions due solely to lack of space." Id. at 976. The court then went on to direct an
expansive reorganization and enlargement of the District of Columbia youth correc-
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utilization of the F.Y.C.A. would jeopardize the public safety by providing
11 2
for the premature release of dangerous criminals.
In summation, the thrust of the counter-argument centers upon a perception of the legislative intent in the passage of the F.Y.C.A. Relying upon the
available legislative history, the District of Columbia Circuit's critics contend
that the clear purpose of the Act was to allow the more permissive Youth
Act sentencing only to those youths whe are considered rehabilitable.
The intent was not to withdraw all discretion from the sentencing judge
by imposing unworkable standards and confining parameters upon him.
Such a limiting of prerogatives would, according to the dissenters, grant
Youth Act treatment to all youthful criminals, irrespective of their amenability to such treatment. Such a result they maintain, would defeat the
purpose of the Act and preclude meaningful treatment of any youths.
Conclusion
The controversy concerning the construction of section 5010(d) of the
Federal Youth Corrections Act is one of more than little significance. This
exceptional piece of legislation offers those sentenced under it a unique opportunity for rehabilitation through vocational training and individualized treatment. The number of youths receiving Youth Act sentences under the
interpretation adopted by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
would no doubt be considerably greater than in those jurisdictions where
the discretionary approach predominates. Because the course of an offender's life is determined, to a very real extent, by the type of incarceration
to which he is subjected, the interpretative issue presented is of considerable
import. An examination of the debate demonstrates that credible arguments exist on both sides. However, when balancing the weight of all the
arguments, it is evident that the view espoused by the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia emerges as the legally preferable one.
The District of Columbia court presented two extremely convincing arguments. First, it relied on the plain meaning of the words in the Act."13 The
subsection under discussion is phrased so as to permit an adult sentence only
in the event that the judge first affirmatively finds that the offender will retional facilities. For a detailed discussion of the Alsbrook decision see 6 SUFF. U.L.
REV. 1105 (1972). For cases where courts have ordered improvements to be made in
correctional facilities see also Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), ajf'd,
442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971);
Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
112. 118 CONG. REC. 3196 (daily ed. March 3, 1972).

113. See notes 88-90 and accompanying text, supra.
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ceive no benefit from treatment under the Act. The words and their intended meaning are specific and unambiguous. Second, the court substantiated its construction of section 5010(d) by maintaining that such an interpretation best effectuated the legislative purposes of the entire Act. The court
notes that the primary supposition upon which the Act was created was that
young people convicted of crimes generally possess a greater potential for
rehabilitation than do older, more experienced criminals. 114 It further notes
that Congress went to extreme lengths to formulate, with precise detail, a
comprehensive system for effectively channeling this potential in constructive
directions. 115 These observations compel the conclusion that Congress, in
its desire to redirect the mistaken course of society's young offenders, formulated an elaborate design which extends to these youths a presumptive right
to rehabilitative treatment. The District of Columbia Circuit's construction
of section 5010(d) goes further than any other in realizing this legislative
objective and in so doing best effectuates the purpose of the Federal Youth
Corrections Act.
Drawing an analogy between the District of Columbia Circuit's reasoning
and the Tenth Circuit's holding in Rogers v. United States" 6 lends additional
support to the former's interpretation. The court in Rogers was called upon
to construe the meaning of section 5010(b) by determining what facts the
trial court must establish before sentencing under it. The relevant wording of
5010(b) reads much like that of 5010(d), containing the phrases "[i]f
the court shall find" and "then the court may," both of which are included
in 5010(d). The court in Rogers held that the subsection "requires and
makes mandatory two preliminary findings by the court before a sentence
may be imposed under the Act: (1) That the convicted person is a youth
offender, and (2) that the offense is punishable by imprisonment . .. .,11
The court further held there must be evidence that these findings were affirmatively made by the court. Given the identical phraseology and format
of sections 5010(b) and 5010(d), a similar holding of an affirmative finding
seems appropriate under the latter provision. The statutory language clearly
dictates such a preliminary finding.
In determining which of two competing statutory interpretations applies
the more convincing analysis, the fundamental strengths and weaknesses of
both positions must be probed. Having done so, it is the author's conclusion
that the reasoning employed by the District of Columbia Circuit is both
logical and convincing. In stark contrast to the cogent arguments advanced
114.
115.
116.
117.

United States v. Waters, 437 F.2d at 724.
United States v. Coefield, 476 F.2d at 1156-57.
326 F.2d 56 (10th Cir. 1963).
Id. at 58 (emphasis added).
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by that court, the position suggested by those taking issue with the District
of Columbia court's holdings is subject, point by point, to more persuasive
counter-arguments. The rationales employed by those individuals simply
cannot withstand close scrutiny.
The accuracy of this statement can be appreciated by an examination
of the principal weapon relied upon by those attacking the District of Columbia court's position, namely, the legislative history accompanying the
Act. As outlined in the preceding pages, considerable language in the legislative history underlines the discretionary nature of the Act. 118 However,
in light of the unambiguous statement of section 5010(d), these references are
of minimal significance. It is a well-established legal doctrine that only when
the statute's meaning is unclear on its face is it permissible to turn to the
legislative history for assistance in implementing the Act's provisions. 1" 9
As also demonstrated earlier, the language in the Senate 120 and House 12 1
Committee Reports strongly supports the District of Columbia construction.
In addition to these references other factors exist which need consideration
when seeking to rely on the legislative history of this particular Act. Most
notable of these considerations is the paucity of actual legislative history
upon which such great reliance is placed. The Senate subcommittee hearings were attended by only two Senators, with substantially all the questioning undertaken by one of them.' 22 It is from these hearings that the reasoning concerning the legislative intent to provide an additional discretionary
tool for the sentencing judge is extracted. In placing such heavy dependence
on these hearings the assumption is apparently being made that the members of Congress voting on the bill were knowledgeable of the views expressed at those hearings. This seems to be a fallacious assumption. The
more reasonable conclusion is that the vast majority of the legislators were
unaware of what transpired at these hearings and were instead voting on
the content of the Act's language as it appeared before them.
118. See notes 102-108 and accompanying text supra.
119. See Daniels v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 942 (D. Mont. 1962), af 'd, 372
U.S. 704 (1963); Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244 (1945). Generally, legislative intent must be ascertained from the text of a statute if the words are clear, plain
and unambiguous; Community Blood Bank of Kansas City Area, Inc. v. F.T.C., 405
F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. New England Coal and Coke Co., 318
F.2d 138 (Ist Cir. 1963).
120. S. REP. No. 1180, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1949).
121. H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3983
(1950).
122. The Senate hearings were held October 5-7, 1949. A total of 12 witnesses
testified. Senator Harley M. Kilgore (D.-W.Va.) presided and was responsible for
virtually all the questioning. Senator Frank P. Graham (D.-N.C.) was present for the
October 6th session, for the most part assuming the role of an observer.
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In addition to stressing the legislative history, those disagreeing with the
District of Columbia Circuit's reasoning attack the "no benefit" standard as
vague and unworkable. There are, admittedly, problems with the application of such a standard. No doubt mistakes will be made-both favoring
and denying treatment. But certainly it cannot be said that the standard
is so vague as to amount to no standard at all. Clearly, when the Act
speaks of "benefit from treatment" it is referring to rehabilitative benefit
and not merely "more pleasant surroundings." The allegation is made that
the District of Columbia court usurps the traditional discretion vested in a
sentencing judge by forcing him to implement the nebulous standard which
it holds as the law. By its own words the District of Columbia Circuit proves
that accusation unfounded. In Coefield the court said:
We note, however, the recognition that the trial judge retains discretion to "deny such rehabilitative treatment of those youths in
the exceptional case where the judge determines that the special
123
youth treatment afforded by the Act would be of no value.'
Expressed succinctly, the trial judge retains his discretionary powers, subject only to the restriction that he make certain affirmative findings before
exercising that discretion. Ultimately, what the District of Columbia Circuit is requiring of its federal trial judges is not overly taxing or unreasonable. The court, in seeking to realize the rehabilitative goals of the legislation, demands only that the judge make a knowledgeable and well-considered decision regarding the sentence applied to a youth. To aid the judge
in his deliberations the court requires that he make use of certain professional
evaluations and recommendations provided for in the Act. Finally, to properly perform its appellate responsibility, the court requires a statement of
reasons upon which the trial judge relied.
None of these requirements usurp the traditional discretion of a trial
judge. They simply serve to insure that such discretion is knowingly and
properly exercised in accordance with the legislative dictates of the Act.
Only through such an implementation of section 5010(d) will the potential
embodied in today's youthful offender, and appreciated by those responsible
for the Federal Youth Corrections Act over twenty years ago, be fully
realized.
DeborahAnne Boggs

123. 476 F.2d at 1155, quoting United States v. Waters, 437 F.2d at 724.

